Epistemic Injustice and Performing Know-How, Social Epistemology 35, no. 6: 608–620 (2021)

I expand our framework for epistemic injustice by shifting focus from epistemic evaluations of individuals in information exchange to epistemic evaluations of individuals engaging their know-how in performance.

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What Should an Account of Know-How be an Account of?

I argue that there are two versions of 'the practical thesis' lurking in the debate about know-how and that no one view of know-how can vindicate both.

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Knowing How and Being Able (under review)

I show that intellectualism fails to explain the very cases that are supposed to showcase knowledge-how without ability. The upshot, however, is not an objection to intellectualism per se, but to the anti-entailment claim that intellectualists tend to endorse.

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The Knowledge Objection to Knowledge-How (under review)

I develop a novel response to the objection that Ryle's account of knowledge-how fails to be a kind of knowledge by conceding its main criticism: Ryle doesn’t offer a view of knowledge-how as a kind of knowledge. Ryle offers a view of the nature of intelligence, so the objection just doesn't apply.

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How to Over-Intellectualize Knowledge-How (draft available upon request)
I argue that there's no such thing as 'over-intellectualizing' an account of knowledge-how as such, and I find the proper application of the over-intellectualization worry.