Published
Minimal Intellectualism about Know-How (forthcoming in Inquiry; published version here)
I dispense with the myth that knowing how is, or requires, a distinctively practical kind of knowledge.
Knowing How and Being Able, Synthese 204, no. 76 (2024)
I show that intellectualism about know-how fails to explain the very cases that are supposed to showcase know-how without ability. The upshot, however, is not an objection to intellectualism per se, but to the anti-entailment claim intellectualists tend to endorse.
Epistemic Injustice and Performing Know-How, Social Epistemology 35, no. 6: 608–620 (2021)
The literature on epistemic injustice is devoted to understanding how epistemic injustice occurs in contexts of information exchange. I develop a view of epistemic injustice in the context of performance, how it occurs in our evaluations of what people know how to do.
In Progress
Intellectualism and Nonhuman Animal Knowledge (PAMBA Prize honorable mention; under revision)
Folks in the literature tend to treat nonhuman animals as a case against intellectualism about know-how. The idea is that although we have evidence of nonhuman animal know-how, we have no evidence of nonhuman animal knowledge. I argue that our evidence of nonhuman animal know-how just is our evidence of nonhuman animal knowledge. To think otherwise is to over-intellectualize knowledge itself.
Does AlphaGo Know How to Play Go? (very much in progress--no draft yet available)
I show how several prominent anti-intellectualist theories of know-how predict that AlphaGo does indeed know how to play Go. I then argue that this is an undesirable trait in a theory of know-how.
Must There Be Nonpropositional Knowledge? (draft available upon request)
I argue that anti-intellectualism about know-how doesn't generate reason to think there's a kind of nonpropositional knowledge.
Ryle's View of Intelligence (draft available upon request)
I argue that we shouldn't take Ryle’s distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' to be epistemological, or else we make the very mistake Ryle was trying to caution us against—we end up assuming that knowledge is the paradigmatic manifestation of intelligence.
Handouts
