Published
Knowing How and Being Able, Synthese 204, no. 76 (2024)
I show that intellectualism about know-how fails to explain the very cases that are supposed to showcase know-how without ability. The upshot, however, is not an objection to intellectualism per se, but to the anti-entailment claim intellectualists tend to endorse.
Epistemic Injustice and Performing Know-How, Social Epistemology 35, no. 6: 608–620 (2021)
The literature on epistemic injustice is devoted to understanding how epistemic injustice occurs in contexts of information exchange. I develop a view of epistemic injustice in the context of performance, how it occurs in our evaluations of what people know how to do.
In Progress
Intellectualism and Nonhuman Animal Knowledge (PAMBA Prize honorable mention; under review)
Folks in the literature tend to treat nonhuman animals as a case against intellectualism about know-how. The idea is that although we have evidence of nonhuman animal know-how, we have no evidence of nonhuman animal knowledge. I argue that our evidence of nonhuman animal know-how just is our evidence of nonhuman animal knowledge. To think otherwise is to over-intellectualize knowledge itself.
Must There Be Nonpropositional Knowledge? (under review)
I argue that anti-intellectualism about know-how doesn't generate reason to think there's a kind of nonpropositional knowledge.
There's No Such Thing as Knowledge-How (under revision)
I dispense with the myth that knowing how is, or requires, a distinctively practical kind of knowledge.
What Is 'Knowledge-How'? (draft of a previous version available upon request)
I show that the debate about know-how contains two explanatory projects. Insofar as parties to the ‘debate’ take up distinct explanatory aims, they’re not at odds about the nature of knowing how, but about what ‘knowledge-how’ picks out: a state or its application.
Ryle's View of Intelligence
I argue that we shouldn't take Ryle’s distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' to be epistemological, or else we make the very mistake Ryle was trying to caution us against—we end up assuming that knowledge is the paradigmatic manifestation of intelligence.
Handouts
