Published
Knowing How and Being Able, Synthese 204, no. 76 (2024)
I show that intellectualism about know-how fails to explain the very cases that are supposed to showcase know-how without ability. The upshot, however, is not an objection to intellectualism per se, but to the anti-entailment claim intellectualists tend to endorse.
Epistemic Injustice and Performing Know-How, Social Epistemology 35, no. 6: 608–620 (2021)
The literature on epistemic injustice is devoted to understanding how epistemic injustice occurs in contexts of information exchange. I develop a view of epistemic injustice in the context of performance, how it occurs in our evaluations of what people know how to do.
In Progress
There's No Such Thing as Knowledge-How
I dispense with the myth that knowing how is, or requires, a distinctively practical kind of knowledge.
How to Over-Intellectualize Know-How (under review)
I argue that there's no risk of 'over-intellectualizing' know-how, and I find that the proper application of the over-intellectualization worry is to our accounts of intelligent (intentional) action.
The Knowledge Objection to Know-How (under revision)
I develop a novel response to the objection that Ryle's account of knowledge-how fails to be a kind of knowledge by conceding its main criticism: Ryle doesn’t offer a view of knowledge-how as a kind of knowledge. Ryle's view is about intelligence, so the objection doesn't apply.
What Is 'Knowledge-How'? (draft of a previous version available upon request)
I show that the debate about know-how contains two explanatory projects. Insofar as parties to the ‘debate’ take up distinct explanatory aims, they’re not at odds about the nature of knowing how, but about what ‘knowledge-how’ picks out: a state or its application.
Ryle's View of Intelligence
I argue that we shouldn't take Ryle’s distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' to be epistemological, or else we make the very mistake Ryle was trying to caution us against—we end up assuming that knowledge is the paradigmatic manifestation of intelligence.
