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Epistemic Injustice and Performing Know-How, Social Epistemology 35, no. 6: 608–620 (2021)

I expand our framework for epistemic injustice by showing that it can occur not only in our evaluations of what people know, but also in our evaluations of what people know how to do.

Knowing How and Being Able (forthcoming in Synthese)

I show that intellectualism fails to explain the very cases that are supposed to showcase knowledge-how without ability. The upshot, however, is not an objection to intellectualism per se, but to the anti-entailment claim intellectualists tend to endorse.

How to Over-Intellectualize Know-How
I argue that there's no such thing as 'over-intellectualizing' know-how, and I find the proper application of the over-intellectualization worry is to our accounts of intelligent action.

The Knowledge Objection to Knowledge-How

I develop a novel response to the objection that Ryle's account of knowledge-how fails to be a kind of knowledge by conceding its main criticism: Ryle doesn’t offer a view of knowledge-how as a kind of knowledge. Ryle's view is about intelligence, so the objection doesn't apply.

What Should an Account of Know-How be an Account of?

I argue that there are two versions of 'the practical thesis' lurking in the debate about know-how and that no one view of know-how can vindicate both.

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