Published
Minimal Intellectualism about Know-How (forthcoming in Inquiry; published version here)
I dispense with the myth that knowing how is, or requires, a distinctively practical kind of knowledge. (Previous, more incendiary title: "There's No Such Thing as 'Knowledge-How'")
Knowing How and Being Able, Synthese 204, no. 76 (2024)
I show that intellectualism about know-how fails to explain the very cases that are supposed to showcase know-how without ability. The upshot, however, is not an objection to intellectualism per se, but to the anti-entailment claim intellectualists tend to endorse.
Epistemic Injustice and Performing Know-How, Social Epistemology 35, no. 6: 608–620 (2021)
The literature on epistemic injustice is devoted to understanding how epistemic injustice occurs in contexts of information exchange. I develop a view of epistemic injustice in the context of performance, how it occurs in our evaluations of what people know how to do.
In Progress
Intellectualism and Nonhuman Animal Knowledge (PAMBA Prize honorable mention; under revision)
Folks in the literature tend to treat nonhuman animals as a case against intellectualism about know-how. The idea is that although we have evidence of nonhuman animal know-how, we have no evidence of nonhuman animal knowledge. I argue that our evidence of nonhuman animal know-how just is our evidence of nonhuman animal knowledge. To think otherwise is to over-intellectualize knowledge itself.
Epistemic Reasons for Ignorance (very much in progress--no draft yet available)
A significant but overlooked aspect of our epistemic lives is this: We not only pursue information, but we navigate an onslaught of information that pursues us (think, e.g., advertisements and AI summaries). In this paper I consider the conditions under which we're epistemically better off forgoing proffered information--conditions under which we have reason to choose ignorance over knowledge.
Does AlphaGo Know How to Play Go? (no draft yet available)
I show how several prominent anti-intellectualist theories of know-how predict that AlphaGo does indeed know how to play Go. I then argue that this is an undesirable trait in a theory of know-how.
Handouts
