Published
Knowing How and Being Able, Synthese 204, no. 76 (2024)
I show that intellectualism about know-how fails to explain the very cases that are supposed to showcase know-how without ability. The upshot, however, is not an objection to intellectualism per se, but to the anti-entailment claim intellectualists tend to endorse.
Epistemic Injustice and Performing Know-How, Social Epistemology 35, no. 6: 608–620 (2021)
The literature on epistemic injustice is devoted to understanding how epistemic injustice occurs in contexts of information exchange. I develop a view of epistemic injustice in the context of performance, how it occurs in our evaluations of what people know how to do.
In Progress
How to Over-Intellectualize Action
I argue that there's no risk of 'over-intellectualizing' know-how, and I find that the proper application of the over-intellectualization worry is to our accounts of intelligent (intentional) action.
I develop a novel response to the objection that Ryle's account of knowledge-how fails to be a kind of knowledge by conceding its main criticism: Ryle doesn’t offer a view of knowledge-how as a kind of knowledge. Ryle's view is about intelligence, so the objection doesn't apply.
What Should an Account of Know-How be an Account of?
I argue that there are two versions of 'the practical thesis' lurking in the debate about know-how and that no one view of know-how can vindicate both.
