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Published

Minimal Intellectualism about Know-How (forthcoming in Inquiry; published version here)

I dispense with the myth that knowing how is, or requires, a distinctively practical kind of knowledge. (Previous, more incendiary title: "There's No Such Thing as 'Knowledge-How'")

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Knowing How and Being Able, Synthese 204, no. 76 (2024)

I show that intellectualism about know-how fails to explain the very cases that are supposed to showcase know-how without ability. The upshot, however, is not an objection to intellectualism per se, but to the anti-entailment claim intellectualists tend to endorse.

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Epistemic Injustice and Performing Know-How, Social Epistemology 35, no. 6: 608–620 (2021)

The literature on epistemic injustice is devoted to understanding how epistemic injustice occurs in contexts of information exchange. I develop a view of epistemic injustice in the context of performance, how it occurs in our evaluations of what people know how to do.​

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In Progress

​​Intellectualism and Nonhuman Animal Knowledge (PAMBA Prize honorable mention; under revision)
Folks in the literature tend to treat nonhuman animals as a case against intellectualism about know-how. The idea is that although we have evidence of nonhuman animal know-how, we have no evidence of nonhuman animal
knowledge. I argue that our evidence of nonhuman animal know-how just is our evidence of nonhuman animal knowledge. To think otherwise is to over-intellectualize knowledge itself.

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Epistemic Reasons for Ignorance (very much in progress--no draft yet available)

A significant but overlooked aspect of our epistemic lives is this: We not only pursue information, but we navigate an onslaught of information that pursues us (think, e.g., advertisements and AI summaries). In this paper I consider the conditions under which we're epistemically better off forgoing proffered information--conditions under which we have reason to choose ignorance over knowledge.

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Does AlphaGo Know How to Play Go? (no draft yet available)

I show how several prominent anti-intellectualist theories of know-how predict that AlphaGo does indeed know how to play Go. I then argue that this is an undesirable trait in a theory of know-how.​​​​​

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Handouts

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